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The supply of foreign aid is most often considered from the
perspective of recipients. Less analysis has been devoted to
quantifying supply-side factors that inﬂuence aid disburse-
ments made by individual donors. Nevertheless, in the wake
of the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09 and ongoing pressures on
government ﬁnances in many developed countries, this ques-
tion has taken on renewed importance. Some scholars suggest
that aid volumes can fall drastically in response to ﬁnancial
diﬃculties in donor countries. For example, Roodman
(2008) calculated that after the Nordic ﬁnancial crisis of
1991, aid from Norway, Sweden, and Finland fell by 10%,
17%, and 62%, respectively (measured from peak to trough
and adjusted for inﬂation). At the same time, a long tradition
of scholarship points to a number of slow moving factors, such
as past colonial relationships, that play a key role in determin-
ing aid supplies (Alesina & Dollar, 2000). Additionally, chang-
ing domestic and global security concerns appear to have led
to a renewed use of foreign aid to achieve security objectives
(Woods, 2005).
The above discussion raises two challenges. First, a diverse
range of factors are likely to inﬂuence aid decisions and these
factors may be in tension. Thus, it is helpful to make a distinc-
tion between long-run trends and short-run dynamics in aid
supplies. Second, not all donors are alike and behavior
changes over time. Thus, heterogeneity between and within
countries should be taken into account. To date, these issues
have not been adequately addressed, in part due to a lack of
adequate data. However, moderately long time series data
are now available for at least 20 of the largest OECD donors.
As such, econometric techniques can be employed that are
consistent in the face of slope heterogeneity and time series
non-stationarity. 1 Moreover, these methods can generate
country-speciﬁc estimates of aid supply behavior, which are
of interest in themselves.
The objective of this study is to examine the determinants of
aid supplies over the period 1960–2009, taking due account of
the heterogeneity and complexity of donor behavior. The rest
of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a
review of existing literature, motivating the present focus on31neglected aspects. In response, Section 3 proposes a simple
conceptual framework. Section 4 sets out corresponding
empirical methods to test this model, giving particular atten-
tion to the technical challenges of parameter heterogeneity,
non-stationarity, and cross-section dependence. The same sec-
tion also introduces the data and variables used in the analysis.
Section 5 presents the results, separating the analysis between
factors aﬀecting long-run trends in aid supplies and their
shorter-run dynamics.
To preview the main ﬁndings, there is strong evidence of
substantial heterogeneity in aid supply behavior. This operates
both between countries and over time, suggesting there have
been distinct ‘aid regimes’ in diﬀerent periods. Indeed, over
the 2000s there appears to be a growing link between aid
and security concerns, as well as greater responsiveness of
total aid volumes to democratization and income growth in
developing countries. In this sense, donors do not act in isola-
tion. There is also evidence of positive bandwagon eﬀects,
meaning that donors are inﬂuenced by the behavior of their
peers. Lastly, and as other studies have found, domestic mac-
roeconomic conditions aﬀect aid supplies. Donors supply aid
in a moderately pro-cyclical fashion and ﬁscal consolidation
is associated with falling aid budgets.
Before proceeding, some disclaimers are necessary. This
study does not address questions regarding where aid is
allocated or whether it is eﬀective. 2 Thus, no assumptions
are made about how changes in aggregate aid supplies are
likely to aﬀect recipient countries or sectors. Additionally,
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DAC donors (such as China and India), philanthropic organi-
zations, vertical funds (e.g., The Global Fund) or multilateral
institutions. These are merely excluded for reasons of clarity
and length, as well as data limitations, not because of their
irrelevance. Lastly, the focus of this paper is on the aggregate
behavior of donors rather than on speciﬁc donor–recipient
relations. Thus, inﬂuences on (aggregate) aid supplies that
are driven by particular bilateral interactions are not fully con-
sidered.2. EXISTING STUDIES
Academic research concerning foreign aid is extensive.
Nonetheless, three themes recur: how much aid is provided,
who and what it is provided to, and whether or not it is eﬀec-
tive. Although these issues are closely related, the focus of this
study is exclusively on factors that determine the quantity of
aid supplied, which can be thought of as a ﬁrst-order decision
facing each donor. This section summarizes some of the main
insights of existing research in this area. To do so, it helps to
distinguish between three groups of factors that have been
noted as drivers of aid supplies. These are referred to below
as ‘‘motives”, ‘‘capacities”, and ‘‘constraints”.
With respect to motives for providing foreign aid, the rel-
ative wealth of advanced countries is often said to create
external obligations. Since the early post-war period, when
foreign aid became established as an instrument for promot-
ing economic development, donors have made various com-
mitments to donate a share of their national income in aid.
The World Bank’s Pearson Commission, concluded in 1969,
recommended that bilateral donors increase net aid disburse-
ments to 0.7% of gross national product by at least 1980
(Clemens, Kenny, & Moss, 2007). Exhortations to achieve
this ﬁgure have been repeated in various multilateral settings
including General Assembly resolutions, the UN’s 2002
International Conference on Financing for Development
held in Monterrey (Mexico), as well as the 2005 Gleneagles
G8 and Millennium +5 summits. However, few donors con-
sistently meet this target. Rather, countries display distinct
preferences toward giving foreign aid, evidenced by large
and persistent diﬀerences in aid eﬀort, deﬁned as the foreign
aid to domestic income ratio (or the dollar value of aid sup-
ply per capita). This is illustrated in Figures A1–A4 of Web
Appendix A, which plot real net bilateral aid ﬂows by coun-
try as a share of GDP (Web Appendix B details the vari-
ables, data sources, and country abbreviations used
throughout).
The importance of country-speciﬁc preferences underpin-
ning aid volumes is well established. Round and Odedokun
(2004) estimate a panel ﬁxed eﬀects model of donors’ Aid/
GDP ratios that is able to account for over 80% of the var-
iation in the ratio around its overall mean. Chong and Grad-
stein (2008) employ data from the World Values Survey to
identify factors that aﬀect popular support for foreign aid
within donor countries (see also Ball, 2010). Based on their
main speciﬁcation, a full 65% of the variation in aid dis-
bursements is accounted for by donor ﬁxed eﬀects. In a sem-
inal contribution, Alesina and Dollar (2000) identify certain
slow-changing factors, such as colonial history and religious
aﬃliation, as important drivers of how much aid is supplied
to speciﬁc countries. Country-speciﬁc studies also remark on
the ‘‘individuality” of donors. For instance, Bertoli, Cornia,
and Manaresi (2008) highlight the distinctive behavior of
Italian aid disbursements compared to its peers, as well asthe heterogeneous time series behavior of aid disbursements
(to GDP) across donors.
In addition to these deep factors, motives for supplying for-
eign aid can change rapidly. Aid can be conceived as a tool
through which citizens (governments) of one country seek to
inﬂuence objectives beyond their own borders. It has multiple
objectives, meaning that changes in global conditions can have
an immediate impact on aid supply decisions. One example is
natural or man-made disasters (see Stro¨mberg, 2007). Citizens
of richer countries often wish to support aﬀected countries that
are overwhelmed. It follows that annual diﬀerences in the mag-
nitude of such disasters can provoke signiﬁcant ﬂuctuations in
the aggregate amount of aid supplied. Geo-political events can
have similar impacts. Woods (2005), for instance, notes how
the shift in the global security agenda following 9/11 led to a
rapid increase in aid directed toward security imperatives. This
is supported by Fleck and Kilby (2010) for the United States,
who ﬁnd that the War on Terror has driven a large increase in
foreign aid disbursements, but also has reduced theweight given
toneeds in the allocationof aid to core recipients.A similar story
is told by Boschini andOlofsgand (2007). They ﬁnd that the end
of the ColdWar led to a signiﬁcant global reduction in bilateral
aid supplies, but that donors were not equally aﬀected by such
geopolitical changes.
A second group of factors refers to perceptions of the capac-
ity of aid to be eﬀective, holding ﬁxed motives for giving.
These are often the focus of the literature on aid quality and
selectivity (e.g., Hout, 2004; Dollar & Levin, 2006; Knack,
Rogers, & Eubank, 2011). As others have noted, the notion
that aid is only eﬀective in promoting growth if domestic gov-
ernance institutions are conducive gained traction during the
mid/late-1990s (Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Other shifts in
thinking about foreign aid can be discerned in academic and
popular debates. These include the importance of debt relief
(see Allen & Weinhold, 2000), the need to prioritise speciﬁc
development objectives (e.g., the Millennium Development
Goals) and improvement of donors’ aid practices (e.g., the
Paris Declaration). This raises the possibility that aggregate
aid supply decisions are inﬂuenced by changing views about
the eﬃcacy of aid (or types of aid), and that such views change
in a coordinated fashion at global or regional levels. Thus, aid
supply behavior may be prone to peer or bandwagon eﬀects
(suggested early on by Dudley & Montmarquette, 1976).
While these factors may be critical for how ﬁxed aid budgets
are allocated, there is no reason to disregard their impact on
overall aid volumes.
Finally, even if motives and perceived capacities are
favorable toward aid, domestic events may place temporary
constraints on aid supply decisions. A number of studies inves-
tigate the impact of domestic macroeconomic shocks (business
cycles) on aid volumes. Pallage and Robe (2001) investigate
the cyclicality of aid from both a donor and recipient perspec-
tive. This topic has received renewed attention since the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008–09. Dang, Knack, and Rogers (2009)
estimate that real aid disbursements fall by up to 25% in
response to systemic banking crises relative to a ‘‘no crisis”
counter-factual. Similarly, Frot (2009) ﬁnds that aid tends to
decline by 13% in response to a ﬁnancial crisis, or 5% per
annum. Dabla-Norris, Minoiu, and Zanna (2010) conﬁrm that
aid tends to be pro-cyclical on average, but can play a
cushioning role when recipient countries face large adverse
terms-of-trade or growth shocks (see also Gravier-Rymaszewska,
2012).
An additional constraint refers to the way in which aid deci-
sions are made. As noted by Mosley (1985), aid outﬂows are
dependent on government budget processes which are path
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year t largely reﬂect the information set and budget allocation
at t  1. Moreover, aid decisions often involve multi-year com-
mitments, such as through a project lifecycle or to overseas
representations. Consequently, aid ﬂows are likely to exhibit
state dependence, meaning that past realizations of aid have
a direct and independent eﬀect on current realizations. Exist-
ing commitments limit the extent to which aid volumes might
fully adjust to shocks or changes in preferences without some
loss of external credibility.
Despite this existing research, a number of gaps remain
which motivate the present study. First, many of the above
themes have been addressed in separate literatures with little
cross-fertilization. For example, studies of preferences toward
foreign aid typically impose a static speciﬁcation, focusing on
the average long-run properties of aid behavior across donors
(e.g., Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Round & Odedokun, 2004). As
such, bandwagon or common eﬀects are often addressed, if at
all, by including year or period dummy variables. These
approaches are not necessarily incorrect or misleading. How-
ever, in focusing on one or other speciﬁc aspect of aid supplies,
the interaction between longer- and shorter-term factors has
been ignored. Disentangling this interaction is important
because policy-makers must account for all sets of factors
when making their aid decisions.
A second gap refers to heterogeneity in aid supply behav-
ior, of which one aspect is diﬀerences between donors. For
example, in addition to having distinct preferences for
giving aid, countries also may place diﬀerent weights on
the importance of longer- or shorter-term inﬂuences. Thus,
responses to economic or political shocks may not be homo-
geneous. A second aspect refers to changes in behavior over
time across donors. As already noted, changes in global
geopolitical conditions may have comparable impacts across
multiple donors, especially where they share similar domes-
tic political and economic conditions (are like-minded).
Neither of these forms of heterogeneity has been entirely
neglected in previous studies. Nonetheless, heterogeneity
has often been considered a secondary issue, and its bearing
on estimation of average behavioral relations has been
overlooked.
The third gap is that many studies treat aid supplies as a
stationary process, in the sense of having mean and variance
that are independent of time. While this assumption is some-
what relaxed when a common time trend is included and/or
aid is scaled by the each donors’ income, insights from the
time series literature show that inconsistencies arise if the
time series properties of the data are not adequately consid-
ered. As Smith (2001) notes, since standard ﬁxed eﬀects esti-
mators rely on variation around a unit-speciﬁc mean for
identiﬁcation, they may not capture any economically
meaningful relations when the dependent variable is non-
stationary. However, if the variables exhibit cointegration,
then techniques can be employed that help to diﬀerentiate
between long-run and dynamic parameters. In the minimum,
the time series properties of the data must be investigated in
order to establish the suitability of whichever techniques are
applied.
In summary, existing studies show that aid supplies are
driven by a diverse range of factors—e.g., long- vs. short-term,
local vs. global. Most often these have been addressed individ-
ually and in separate literatures. Consequently, the objective
of this study is not to discover any new set of factors. Rather,
I seek to give due consideration to four challenges that have
not been fully addressed to date. These are: (i) the distinction
between long- and short-term factors, (ii) the time seriesproperties of aid supplies; (iii) heterogeneity between countries
and over time; and (iv) common factors or bandwagon eﬀects.
It is hoped that in doing so, and when combined with new
data, additional light can be shed on what drives aid supplies.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Taking guidance from the previous section, it is helpful to
set out a general conceptual framework regarding how donor
aid supplies are determined. Details concerning empirical
implementation, including choice of covariates, are addressed
in Section 4. The core assumption of the proposed model is
that, over the long-run, donors seek to meet a target level of
real aid. This target can be seen as rooted in ﬁxed factors that
act as a stabilizing force or attractor to donors’ aid supply
decisions. However, taking into account changes in prefer-
ences and wealth, the target is allowed to move slowly over
time. Additionally, there is considerable scope for short-run
ﬂuctuations around this target, such as owing to unanticipated
macroeconomic events. These shocks can lead countries to
deviate from their aid supply target, at least temporarily. In
the event of such a deviation from the aid target at time
t  1, adjustment toward the target is expected to occur in time
t but is likely to be incomplete and is potentially subject to new
shocks. 3
The framework employed herein explicitly allows for heter-
ogeneity between countries in their long-run aid targets, vari-
ation in these targets through time, and short-run variation
around these trends. Denoting the natural logarithm of total
aid supplied at time t by donor country i as ait, a simple model
for the long-run aid supply target for the same country (ait,
also speciﬁed in natural logarithms) is given by:
ait ¼ li þ ciyit þ di1t þ di2t2 ð1Þ
where li captures country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects (e.g., prefer-
ences toward aid), and y is the country’s aggregate income.
Note that if ci ¼ 1, then Eqn. (1) says that the aid target is a
simple ratio of income that varies over time. (Web Appendix
C provides a quick-reference summary of the variables and
parameters used herein). The long-run aid target constitutes
one element of the actual volume of aid supplied at time t.
Including other factors, a basic general model for (the loga-
rithm) of actual aid supplied at time t by donor country i is:
ait ¼ ð1 aiÞai;t1 þ aiait þ it ð2Þ
where it is assumed that ai P 0, and  represents a generic
error term, about which no assumptions currently are made.
Usefully, this model encapsulates two special cases of donor
behavior. If ai ¼ 0, then aid supplies follow a random walk
and the proposition that they are driven by a long-run target
does not hold. If ai ¼ 1, then aid supplies are always equal
to the long-run target plus error.
To proceed to a more speciﬁc empirical model, further struc-
ture is required. Much of the recent literature concerning the
impact of the ﬁnancial crisis on aid supplies can be understood
as attempts to isolate factors that lead donors to vary aid dis-
bursements over the short-term. From Eqn. (2), these factors
are hidden in the error term. Making them more explicit,
one can assume that the error term is a linear function of addi-
tional factors, denoted by the vector X plus mean zero random
error. Allowing these factors to have a dynamic structure
implies: Dit ¼
PJ
j¼0DX
0
i;tjbj þ git. With this, it is helpful to
re-specify this augmented version of Eqn. (2) in error-correc-
tion form:
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h i
þ k1i þ k2it þ k3iDyit þ
XJ
j¼0
DX 0i;tjbj þ git ð3Þ
and where the ﬁrst three parameters of the second line (RHS)
are composites from previous equations. 4 Contrary to previ-
ous literature (see Section 2), this form has the advantage of
making an explicit distinction between long-run and short-
run determinants of aid supplies. Long-run determinants are
given by the level terms inside the square brackets, which rep-
resent the deviation of actual aid from its target at t  1. If
there is error-correction, in the sense that over the long-run
(absent new shocks) actual aid supplies will tend toward their
target level, then one would expect that empirical estimates of
ai will be bound between zero and 1. Short-run movements
around this relation are driven by the diﬀerence terms (includ-
ing X) and random noise.
Note that the distinction between the timing of eﬀects is
important because unconstrained linear estimates of Eqn.
(3), or its auto-regressive distributed lag equivalent, would
yield coeﬃcients that are composites of the long- and short-
run parameters. State dependence of aid is incorporated via
the lag of real aid on the RHS. Also, changes in GDP poten-
tially exert an immediate impact on aid supplies, via the ﬁrst
diﬀerence term, as well as a lagged impact via changes to the
target level of aid in the next period. Thus, if a ﬁnancial shock
is included as an element of X, then this speciﬁcation allows
one to distinguish between direct eﬀects and indirect eﬀects
via income or other elements of X. Finally, X may refer toTable 1. Unit root and cointe
Country Obs. Aid GDP
AUS 50 0.560 0.056
AUT 49 0.267 0.611
BEL 50 0.970 0.433
CAN 50 0.014 0.355
CHE 44 0.822 0.000
DNK 44 0.450 0.902
ESP 30 0.066 0.627
FIN 48 0.822 0.530
FRA 50 0.499 0.385
GBR 50 1.000 0.245
IRL 36 0.129 0.337
ITA 50 0.729 0.969
JPN 50 0.885 0.622
LUX 26 0.898 0.690
NLD 50 0.014 0.151
NOR 50 0.191 0.939
NZL 49 0.362 0.145
PRT 30 0.540 0.850
SWE 50 0.005 0.136
USA 50 0.960 0.262
v2/mean 45 52.700 52.000
(prob.) 0.085 0.097
Notes: Aid is the log. of net bilateral aid excluding debt relief at 2005 prices; G
variable cell reports the probability associated with the null hypothesis that the
Fuller test (with three lags and a trend term); column CEQs reports the number
from a Johansen vector error-correction procedure, chosen by an information c
test on the residuals from country-speciﬁc estimates of the long-run cointegratin
country-speciﬁc dynamic regressions; the ﬁnal column reports the number of ins
preceding three columns; ﬁnal two rows report the test statistic means or, for A
meta-test of the combined column probabilities (see Maddala and Wu, 1999).
Source: author’s estimates, see Web Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.domestic or global shocks, thus potentially taking into
account common factors across donors in aid supply
behaviors.4. EMPIRICAL APPROACH
The model described in Eqn. (3) is general by deﬁnition.
Empirical choices must be made in order to take the model
to the available data. These cover both the estimation methods
and the variables to enter the model. These issues are
addressed in the next two subsections.
(a) Methodology
Selection of an appropriate estimation method crucially
depends on whether the variables entering the long-run rela-
tionship suggested by Eqn. (1) are stationary. If this is not
the case, then empirical results derived from standard estima-
tors (e.g., OLS) could be spurious. Thus, at the outset, it is
necessary to assess the time series properties of the (log.)
aid and GDP series. A preliminary sense is provided by
Figures A1–A4 in Web Appendix A. In addition to diﬀer-
ences in average aid levels, trends in Aid/GDP are extremely
varied between countries and do not display mean-reversion
in all cases. For example, while some donors consistently
increased their aid budgets during the 1970s and 1980s
toward the 0.7% target (e.g., Norway), others have displayed
prolonged episodes of cuts or surges in real disbursements
(e.g., Italy; Finland).gration tests, by country
CEQs tR tE Rejects
1 4.87 2.82 2
1 4.13 3.05 2
1 3.40 2.25 1
1 5.16 4.03 3
. 5.28 4.01 2
1 6.70 4.32 3
0 5.73 2.21 1
. 6.21 1.39 1
1 3.84 2.61 1
1 6.37 4.73 3
1 3.31 3.51 1
1 4.33 0.78 2
1 4.85 3.78 3
1 5.55 5.25 3
1 6.57 5.85 3
1 5.90 2.16 2
1 4.29 3.16 2
0 5.01 1.16 1
1 6.15 5.75 3
1 3.46 1.71 1
1 5.10 3.10 2
0.00 0.00 .
DP also in logs and 2005 constant prices; for Aid and GDP, each country-
column variable contains a unit root, calculated via an Augmented Dickey
of cointegrating equations between Aid and GDP (on the form of Eqn. 1)
riterion; column tR reports the t-statistic from an Augmented Dickey Fuller
g relation; tE reports the t-statistic on the (lagged) error correction term in
tances the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected for the tests in the
id and GDP, the v2 test statistic and associated probability from a Fisher
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ciﬁc ADF unit root tests (including a constant and trend term)
for the aid and GDP variables. The cells of the respective col-
umns report the probability associated with the null hypothe-
sis that the variable contains a unit root. The vast majority of
these are greater than 0.10, meaning that the null cannot be
rejected. The ﬁnal two rows of these columns implement the
simple panel unit root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu
(1999), where the null hypothesis remains that all panels con-
tain a unit root. These remain insigniﬁcant at the 5% level,
indicating that these series are not trend stationary. 5
While aid and income may individually contain a unit root,
it is plausible that a linear combination is stationary. If so,
then cointegration techniques can be employed that speciﬁ-
cally permit the empirical distinction between short-run and
long-run parameters to be made. Thus, the next analytical step
is to evaluate the cointegration hypothesis. This can be under-
taken using ex post tests that employ residuals derived from
estimates of the long-run (or full) model. This raises the funda-
mental issue of how the panel nature of the data should be
addressed. As is well known, standard panel estimators such
as pooled OLS with ﬁxed eﬀects can be inconsistent in
dynamic time series contexts (Lee, Pesaran, & Smith, 1997;
Haque, Sharma, & Pesaran, 1999; Coakley, Fuertes, & Smith,
2006; Pesaran, 2006). Speciﬁcally, Pedroni (2001) shows that a
ﬁxed estimator will only be consistent in the special case that
the RHS regressors are strictly exogenous and the time series
dynamics are homogeneous across all units of the panel. This
is important because standard estimators may deliver mislead-
ing estimates for the average partial eﬀects (slope coeﬃcients),
calculated over the units of the panel. 6
Various alternatives to a pooled ﬁxed eﬀects model are sug-
gested in the literature. For moderately large panels in both
dimensions N and T, one is the mean group (MG) estimator
of Pesaran and Smith (1995). Based on unit-speciﬁc OLS
regressions, sample average eﬀects are calculated as the
(unweighted) mean of the corresponding distribution of
coeﬃcients across units. 7 This estimator has two important
advantages in the present context. First, it inherits the
super-consistency properties of single-equation OLS (Engle
& Granger, 1987; Stock & Watson, 1993) and is asymptoti-
cally unbiased under a wide range of conditions. Second, as
can be inferred from Eqn. (3), it invokes minimal assumptions
about unit homogeneity—i.e., all units have their own inter-
cepts and slopes. Of course, in comparison to a pooled model,
this requires estimation of many more parameters and
therefore may be ineﬃcient and prone to ﬁnite sample bias.
Mark and Sul (2003) speciﬁcally warn against this fragility,
arguing in favor of aggregate (pooled) panel approaches such
as their dynamic panel OLS estimator.
Ex ante, no single estimator can be preferred. Although
heterogeneity between units is highly plausible, both in long-
and short-term parameters, the number of countries in the
sample is modest (N = 20), meaning that cross-section aver-
ages will be vulnerable to outliers. Consequently, instead of
relying on a single procedure, I compare results across diﬀer-
ent estimators each of which imposes alternative assumptions,
especially as regards the degree of heterogeneity. Also, to
maintain the distinction between long- and short-run parame-
ters I follow the two-step approach due to Engle and Granger
(1987). First, based on diﬀerent estimators, the long-run
relationship of Eqn. (1) is estimated, and cointegration tests
are performed at the panel and country-speciﬁc levels. Second,
the dynamic or short-run model of Eqn. (3) is run, inserting
lagged values of the estimated residuals from the preferred ﬁrst
step estimates as the composite error correction term.Assuming the latter is stationary, and since the remaining
terms enter as ﬁrst diﬀerences, the full speciﬁcation also should
be stationary. This allows a range of estimators to be
employed, again imposing diﬀerent homogeneity assumptions.
Before proceeding, two further issues need to be addressed.
First, where cointegration is encountered, it is necessary to
investigate the number of cointegrating relations in play. A
priori one expects that national income is strictly exogenous
to aid. Nevertheless, both to correct for any potential bias
from the endogeneity of GDP and to improve eﬃciency,
Dynamic OLS (DOLS) terms can be added. Stock andWatson
(1993) show that the (single-equation) DOLS estimator, esti-
mated by adding k > 0 leads and lags of the diﬀerenced
RHS variable (here, real GDP) to the speciﬁcation, is asymp-
totically unbiased and normally distributed even in the pres-
ence of endogenous regressors. Second, correlation between
units in cross-section, which would violate the classical regres-
sion assumption of unit independence, is relevant. Although
time dummies can be used to address such eﬀects, a simple
and preferable alternative is the common correlated eﬀects
(CCE) approach of Pesaran (2006). For the mean group esti-
mators this involves augmenting the model speciﬁcation with
time-speciﬁc cross-section averages of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables (or other covariates) and is consistent under
both heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. This econ-
omizes on degrees of freedom and avoids the problem of miss-
ing time dummies that arise in unbalanced panel cases (as
here). These additional terms also can be added to aggregate
panel estimators, thereby explicitly capturing eﬀects due to
common events facing all donors.
(b) Data
As noted in the Introduction, the empirical part of this study
focuses on the group of established DAC donors. These are
chosen because there exists a suﬃciently long time series that
permits application of the techniques described previously.
As indicated in Table 2, annual data on foreign aid collected
by the OECD–DAC begins in 1960 for 14 countries and pro-
vides over 20 years of data for a further six countries.
Although aid data for newer members of the OECD–DAC
are now becoming available (e.g., for South Korea, Turkey,
and ex-Soviet bloc Eastern European countries) fewer data
points exist. Moreover, aid ﬂows from these donors are com-
paratively small and have a predominantly local focus. Of the
N = 23 countries indicated in the table, three of these (Ger-
many, Iceland, and Greece) are excluded from the regression
analysis due to the small number of valid observations (Th20).
Aid supplied by individual countries is deﬁned as total bilat-
eral aid disbursements minus debt relief. This excludes dis-
bursements to multilateral organizations but includes support
to NGOs and international private organizations. 8 The reason
for excluding multilateral disbursements is that, at least in prin-
ciple, such contributions are more predictable and less subject
to shocks compared to bilateral disbursements. This reﬂects the
fact that core multilateral aid to the largest organizations (e.g.,
UN, World Bank) follows long-term agreements (quotas).
Also, bilateral donors have much less control over the alloca-
tion and use of multilateral funds, meaning these ﬂows are very
diﬀerent in nature. This justiﬁes keeping them apart; nonethe-
less, by excluding multilateral ﬂows, some important aspects of
donor behavior may not be captured.
Full details of the deﬁnitions and sources of the variables
employed in the analysis are provided in Web Appendix B.
In addition to foreign aid, data on donor macroeconomic con-
ditions also are taken from OECD statistical series for the
Table 2. Sample coverage and summary statistics
Net bilateral aid (1960–2009)
Country Code Group Obs. Mean Median Change
United States USA Large 50 14,677 14,066 1.080
Germany DEU n/a 19 6733 6426 0.670
Japan JPN Large 50 5812 6236 3.290
France FRA Large 50 5575 5480 0.215
United Kingdom GBR Large 50 4369 3802 1.922
Netherlands NLD Medium 50 2600 3086 5.192
Canada CAN Medium 50 2224 2393 4.703
Italy ITA Medium 50 2055 1929 4.358
Spain ESP Medium 30 1866 1831 12.39
Sweden SWE Medium 50 1348 1451 12.05
Australia AUS Medium 50 1246 1317 3.422
Norway NOR Small 50 996.6 1095 8.664
Denmark DNK Small 44 969.5 992.9 6.627
Belgium BEL Small 50 952.2 929.0 1.237
Switzerland CHE Small 45 600.0 613.6 6.674
Greece GRC n/a 14 405.5 417.3 14.95
Austria AUT V. small 50 335.4 344.9 10.21
Portugal PRT V. small 30 326.5 342.3 2.563
Finland FIN V. small 50 313.8 311.5 11.80
Ireland IRL V. small 36 236.0 105.0 13.41
New Zealand NZL V. small 50 149.5 148.1 2.221
Luxembourg LUX V. small 30 103.6 64.33 14.32
Iceland ISL n/a 19 12.71 8.305 7.608
Notes: ‘‘Group” refers to the categorization of donors by aid volume as used in the empirical analysis (Table 5); ‘‘Obs” gives the number of valid (annual)
observations on aid for each country; all other columns report summary statistics for aid over the period, with ‘‘Change” being the annual average
percentage change in outﬂow.
Source: author’s calculations; see Web Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions and sources.
36 WORLD DEVELOPMENT1960–2009 period. For consistency between countries and over
time, all money-valued variables are stated in constant 2005
USD with a PPP adjustment. Thus, these sources are suﬃcient
to run the ﬁrst stage of the empirical approach, which pertains
to the long-run aid supply target.
A large number of variables might plausibly enter the short-
run model (as elements of X). However, two requirements
need to be fulﬁlled that place de facto limits on what can be
included—coverage must extend over the full period 1960–
2009; and data must be available on a consistent basis for
all donors. Consequently, in addition to the time and GDP
diﬀerence terms (see Eqn. 3) ﬁve variables are included that
are speciﬁc to each donor. The ﬁrst three are chosen to capture
immediate domestic constraints on aid decisions, as discussed
in the literature. They are the donor’s budget balance (before
aid), the rate of inﬂation, and whether the country is experi-
encing a systemic banking crisis. The remaining two variables
refer to factors that might provoke (quick) changes in motives
for providing aid, but also are individual to each donor. Spe-
ciﬁcally, the change in the number of conﬂicts in which the
country is engaged (directly or indirectly) is used to capture
the impact of security risks on aid ﬂows. Short-run aid band-
wagon eﬀects are captured by average changes in aid disbursed
by other donors.
A further set of variables is employed to reﬂect the inﬂuence
of events or conditions that donors face in common. These
variables take the same value for each donor and refer to plau-
sibly shared ‘‘motives” for providing aid, as well as to com-
mon aspects of perceived ‘constraints’ to aid eﬀectiveness.
The chosen variables refer to changes in: democratization
across the globe, the number of people aﬀected by disasters,
the global number of civil- and state-sponsored conﬂicts, aver-
age incomes in less developed countries, and incomes of other
donors.A ﬁnal issue refers to the dynamic structure by which these
control variables enter the model. Eqn. (3) suggests that ele-
ments of X may be speciﬁed as both contemporaneous and
lagged diﬀerences, reﬂecting the full information set available
and pertinent at time t. 9 However, due to the modest number
of observations for each country, speciﬁcation of a full and
complex dynamic structure to these shock terms would lead
to a large loss in degrees of freedom (and eﬃciency). Thus,
the donor-speciﬁc terms are only entered contemporaneously.
Nonetheless, to capture the less direct way in which global
conditions might aﬀect donor responses, each of these com-
mon variables (excluding the ﬁnal CCE term) is calculated
as a weighted average of recent and past observations. 105. RESULTS
(a) Long-run trends
Table 3 presents estimates of the long-run or target value of
aid, modeled as a function of income and time (see Eqn. 1)
which together allow for gradual changes in preferences for
giving aid. The ﬁrst two columns begin by collapsing the coun-
try–year panel along either the time or country dimension,
thus focusing identiﬁcation on variation in the less aggregate
dimension. Column (1) collapses the data by decade and
focuses on variation between countries; column (2) collapses
the data across donor groups (see Table 2), focusing on
variation over time. The remaining columns employ the full
panel data. Columns (3) and (4) use a panel version of a
Prais–Winsen estimator that incorporates country ﬁxed eﬀects
and allows for auto-correlation in the disturbance term
(denoted as the PCSE estimator; see Reed & Webb, 2010).
Columns (5) and (6) apply the mean group estimator. 11 The
Table 3. Model for long run bilateral aid supplies, 1960–2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Countries Years PCSE PCSE MG MG
GDP (log) 1.03*** 1.06*** 0.82*** 2.90*** 0.60 2.16**
(0.06) (0.02) (0.32) (0.33) (1.28) (0.86)
Time 4.09 0.12 4.22** 5.64** 13.81** 9.02**
(2.81) (1.08) (1.67) (2.47) (6.63) (3.66)
Time2 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.15***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
D GDP ðlogÞtþ1 1.08*** 0.03
(0.40) (1.28)
D GDP ðlogÞt 1.74*** 2.59**
(0.44) (1.12)
D GDP ðlogÞt  1 0.51 1.45**
(0.42) (0.67)
Aid mean 0.37*** 0.74***
(0.07) (0.27)
GDP mean 2.82*** 1.14
(0.65) (1.71)
Constant 732.35*** 702.56*** 420.42 394.43 98.29 1367.03
(83.65) (26.40) (378.86) (628.60) (1651.00) (1188.87)
Obs. 93 150 906 877 906 877
R2 stat. 0.76 0.95 0.80 0.84 0.95 0.97
KaoDFc 0.01 0.46 0.03 6.04 9.46
(prob.) 0.50 0.68 0.49 0.00 0.00
KaoDFt 1.43 5.40 5.94 12.80 16.95
(prob.) 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman stat. 14.15 44.66
(prob.) 0.00 0.00
Notes: dependent variable is the log of net bilateral aid multiplied by 100 (a unit is approximately 1 percentage point); columns (1) and (2) apply OLS
aggregating over decades and donor groups (large, medium, small) respectively; columns (3) and (4) apply a Prais-Winsten ﬁxed eﬀects (PCSE) estimator
allowing for panel-speciﬁc AR1 auto-correlation structure, heteroskedasticity and cross-unit correlation in the error terms; columns (5) and (6) use the
mean group estimator of Pesaran and Smith (1995); columns (4) and (6) add DOLS and CCE terms to the core speciﬁcation; all models use robust
estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. Source: author’s estimates, see Web Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
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dynamic OLS terms (leads and lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerence in
log. GDP) and the CCE terms, which are the unweighted
cross-section averages of aid and GDP at time t.
The results demonstrate that concerns regarding the choice
of estimation technique are important. Diﬀerent estimators
lead to quite diﬀerent interpretations of the data. As expected
from the discussion in Pesaran and Smith (1995), aggregating
heterogeneous dynamic time series across either the time or
cross-section dimensions can produce misleading results (col-
umns 1 and 2). Estimates based on the full panel data are more
similar. For all speciﬁcations there is a positive average elastic-
ity of aid to income and the average trend in aid volumes fol-
lows an inverse-U shape, peaking sometime during the 1990s
depending on the speciﬁcation. However, inclusion of the
dynamic OLS and CCE terms signiﬁcantly alters the magni-
tude of the coeﬃcients on the income term. Also, the coeﬃ-
cient on the average value of (log) aid supplied by other
donors indicates a positive long-run covariance in donors’
behaviors—i.e., they do not act independently of one another.
These terms are jointly signiﬁcant, indicating they should be
retained in a ﬁnal model.
Comparison of the full PCSE and MG results (columns 4
and 6) is facilitated by a Hausman-type test of the two models.
As discussed in Pesaran and Yamagata (2008), this tests the
null hypothesis that the country-speciﬁc slope coeﬃcients
employed by the MG estimator are all drawn from the same
distribution with expectation at the (aggregate) ﬁxed eﬀectparameter point estimates. Reported in the footer of Table 3,
the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, implying that between-
country heterogeneity is material. Additional tests, not
reported in the table, such as a simple Chow test of the good-
ness-of-ﬁt of these two models point to the same conclusion.
Closer inspection of the country-speciﬁc OLS estimates (each
incorporating the CCE terms) substantiates the importance
of taking heterogeneity seriously. These are summarized in
Web Appendix Table D1, from which three points can be
highlighted. First is the variability in the overall goodness-
of-ﬁt of the speciﬁcation between countries, given by the
R-squared statistic, ranging from below 65% in the cases of
Belgium and Italy to over 95% for the Nordic donors, among
others. A stronger goodness-of-ﬁt points to more stable and
predictable aggregate aid disbursements viewed retrospectively
over the long-run, which is likely to have a ﬁrst order relation
to the variability of disbursements at the country-level. 12
Second, the estimated income elasticities of aid span a wide
range, being insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in some cases
(e.g., United Kingdom and Italy) to positive and signiﬁcant
in others (e.g., Ireland, Sweden). Third, the quadratic time
trends also diﬀer substantially, not only in size but also in pro-
ﬁle. While the majority of countries follow the inverse-U shape
noted on aggregate, there are notable deviations. The long-run
trend path of aid supplied by the United Kingdom is
U-shaped, while aid supplied by France, Italy, Japan, and
Portugal has followed no discernible trend (conditional on
income).
38 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThe extent of heterogeneity between countries is evident
from visual inspection. Figure 1 compares actual aid disburse-
ments to the long-run target as derived from country-speciﬁc
empirical estimates of Eqn. (1). Broadly speaking for the
selected countries, there is a clear co-evolution between the
actual and target levels of aid over time which supports the
error-correction framework. However, diﬀerences between
the countries are substantial in terms of both the trend in
actual/target aid and the degree to which the actual aid follows
its target. For instance, Norway (‘‘NOR”) shows a positive
upward trend and stable aid supplies over time. In contrast,
Italy (‘‘ITA”) shows sharp annual variations in aid as well
as changes in the average trend of disbursements from nega-
tive (1960–1980) to positive (1980s) to negative (1990 onward).
The parsimony of the long-run target in Eqn. (1) does not fully
capture these variations, leading to a much wider gap between
targets and actuals in this case, and hence the lower R-squared
statistic (Web Appendix Table D1). This demonstrates the
advantages of moving from a (pooled) panel approach to
country-speciﬁc estimates of aid supply dynamics.
It remains to determine whether these estimates are spuri-
ous. Considering the non-stationarity of both aid and GDP
at the country-level, tests for cointegration must be applied.
Although debate persists regarding the most appropriate of
these, at the panel-level the computationally straightforward
Dickey–Fuller (DF) tests set out in Kao (1999) are reported
in Table 3. 13 At least one of the DFt and DFc statistics reject
the (null) hypothesis of no cointegration for all the estimators.
Considering the above ﬁnding of material cross-country heter-
ogeneity, it also is meaningful to examine cointegration on a
country-by-country basis. Based on the underlying equations
used to derive the MG results (column 6, Table 3), three diﬀer-
ent tests are summarized in the ﬁnal four columns of Table 1.
The ﬁrst test uses Johansen’s vector error-correction model
and identiﬁes the number of cointegrating equations (CEQs)
by minimizing the Hannan and Quinn information criterion
(Gonzalo & Pitarakis, 1998). 14 Second, the stationarity of
the residuals estimated from the country-speciﬁc long-run2
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Figure 1. Actual bilateral aid supplies versus estimated long-run targets (selecte
run targets are the ﬁtted values from country-speciﬁc estimates of Eqn. (1) inclu
text; actual aid is observed disbursequations are tested using individual Dickey–Fuller tests, from
which relevant t-statistics are reported, tR. Third, cointegration
is veriﬁed from an error correction representation where the
table reports the t-statistic, tE, on the lagged error correction
term in a simple form of Eqn. (3). The ﬁnal column of the
table reports the number of times that the null hypothesis of
no cointegration is rejected from these three tests. 15 The vast
majority of countries reject at least two of the tests and all
countries reject at least one. This conﬁrms the conclusion that
the long-run equation estimates are not spurious and that
cointegration techniques are appropriate.
(b) Short-run dynamics
Table 4 reports alternative estimates of the dynamic model,
based on the error correction representation given by Eqn. (3).
Following the two-step procedure, residuals estimated from
the preferred long-run MG estimates are employed as the
error correction terms (lagged). These are derived from the
country-speciﬁc regressions and the coeﬃcient estimates on
this term represent the speed of adjustment toward the pre-
dicted aid target. Additional terms in the model, as described
in Section 4, reﬂect factors that may provoke short-run devia-
tions from this target. Results from a variety of diﬀerent esti-
mators are reported in order to investigate the nature of
heterogeneity between countries and sensitivity to alternative
identiﬁcation assumptions. Thus, columns (1) and (2) respec-
tively collapse the data by decades and donor groups (as in
Table 3); column (3) is a pooled OLS estimator; column (4)
is a standard panel ﬁxed eﬀects estimator; column (5) is the
PCSE estimator; and column (6) is the mean group estimator.
As in the long-run case, the estimates from the aggregated
data (columns 1 and 2) are not particularly informative and
in some instances contradict estimates from the full data.
For instance, these models suggest that the error correction
term is either not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero or very
small. In all the panel models, however, the error correction
term is negative and shows at least a moderate adjustment7.
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d countries). Notes: all aid variables expressed in log. form; estimated long-
ding CCE terms for aid and GDP, as per the MG estimator described in the
ements. author’s calculations.
Table 4. Error correction model for bilateral aid ﬂows, 1960–2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Countries Years OLS FE PCSE MG
Error correction (lag) 0.20 0.02* 0.23*** 0.23** 0.24*** 0.57***
(0.13) (0.01) (0.06) (0.10) (0.03) (0.08)
Time 0.05 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.16** 0.44**
(0.08) (0.02) (0.10) (0.11) (0.07) (0.21)
D Real GDP 2.50*** 0.07 1.63*** 1.49*** 1.51*** 0.63
(0.62) (0.13) (0.48) (0.51) (0.33) (0.96)
D Budget balance 3.25** 0.36 1.35*** 1.27** 1.15*** 1.76*
(1.52) (0.30) (0.51) (0.49) (0.34) (0.92)
D CPI 0.02*** 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.36* 1.03**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.27) (0.19) (0.41)
Bank crisis (dummy) 3.66 0.85 0.43 1.84 0.98 1.45
(6.96) (2.43) (3.01) (3.65) (2.25) (3.13)
D Conﬂicts (donor) 7.74 0.87 0.77 0.89 1.24 6.11*
(8.86) (0.58) (1.28) (1.33) (1.09) (3.48)
D Aid (peer mean) 0.35* 0.98*** 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.27**
(0.20) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.05) (0.13)
D Democracies (global) 0.04 0.35 0.43 0.38 0.04
(0.07) (0.44) (0.31) (0.29) (0.45)
D Disasters (global) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
D State conﬂicts (global) 0.07 0.82 0.71 1.26 2.05
(0.15) (1.45) (1.25) (0.97) (2.16)
D Civil conﬂicts (global) 0.16 0.59 0.63 0.76** 1.97*
(0.13) (0.42) (0.48) (0.32) (1.15)
D Low income GDP 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.29 0.00
(0.05) (0.32) (0.25) (0.21) (0.40)
D GDP (mean) 0.89 0.89 0.72 0.54
(0.78) (1.06) (0.55) (1.43)
Constant 5.66 0.25 5.42 7.31 4.42 19.46**
(4.03) (0.83) (5.57) (6.32) (3.98) (9.34)
Obs. 89 141 736 736 736 736
R2 stat. 0.33 0.96 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.55
Hausman stat. 29.4
(prob.) 0.01
Notes: dependent variable is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the log. of net bilateral aid multiplied by 100; columns (1) and (2) apply OLS aggregating over decades
and donor groups respectively; column (3) is pooled OLS; column (4) a standard ﬁxed eﬀects panel OLS estimator; column (5) applies a Prais-Winsten
estimator with country ﬁxed eﬀects; column (6) uses the mean group estimator; all models deﬁne the lagged error correction term from country-speciﬁc
residuals estimated from Table 3 column (6); all models use robust estimates of the variance-covariance matrix. Source: author’s estimates, see Web
Appendix B for variable deﬁnitions.
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Estimates based on the full panel data are more alike and
there are few substantive diﬀerences between columns (3)
and (5).
The magnitude and signiﬁcance of covariates representing
domestic ‘constraints’ on aid supplies are broadly robust to
the panel estimator chosen. Consistent with a range of previ-
ous studies (e.g., Dang et al., 2009), changes in ﬁscal condi-
tions in donor countries have a material impact on
aggregate aid budgets. The pooled OLS estimates suggest a
1 percentage point improvement in the budget balance as a
share of GDP before aid is associated with a 1.35 (log.) per-
centage point reduction in total aid. In itself, this impact is
moderate. However, since ﬁscal consolidation episodes may
be accompanied or preceded by a decline in real output and
prices, the overall eﬀect on aid budgets of economic diﬃculties
in donor countries may be more substantial, especially where
the long-run aid target also falls. 16 Indeed, the estimated coef-
ﬁcients on changes in real GDP are positive and greater thanone (columns 3–5), supporting previous ﬁndings that aid bud-
gets behave in a pro-cyclical manner. However, from these
average results for the full period, there is no evidence that sys-
temic banking crises lead to additional or independent reduc-
tions in expected aid supplies.
With respect to estimates for the other variables in the
model, columns (3)–(6) present no consistent ﬁndings. In fact,
virtually all these coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, which suggests they do not contribute to explaining
the average behavior of donors. The absence of a systematic
aid supply response to events such as changes in institutions
(democracies), in the number of people aﬀected by disasters,
or in the incomes in lower income countries merits reﬂection.
One interpretation is that, when considered as a group, donors
do not systematically respond to these global factors, in turn
implying that other, possibly country-speciﬁc, factors are
given much greater weight. This would be consistent with
familiar critiques that donors are unresponsive to certain
development needs (see Wisner & Gaillard, 2009).
40 WORLD DEVELOPMENTEstimates for the mean group estimator (column 6)
diverge in some ways from the other panel estimates. These
results indicate a moderate positive short-run aid band-
wagon eﬀect (see also Mosley, 1985; Round & Odedokun,
2004), as well as a decline in aid volumes when the donor
country becomes directly or indirectly engaged in conﬂicts.
These results, however, also are moderate in magnitude
and may be statistically fragile (e.g., they are not signiﬁcant
at the 1% level). As such, they do not provide strong
grounds for making claims about the general behavior of
donors. A more robust conclusion is that donors respond
in very diﬀerent ways to domestic and global events. This
is supported by the country-speciﬁc regression estimates,
summarized in Web Appendix Table D2. Among other
things, these estimates point to large diﬀerences in the speed
of error correction (e.g., USA = 0.21; Denmark = 0.82);
and only two countries (Finland and Norway; highlighted
by Roodman, 2008) report a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect
due to banking crises. Moreover, although there are someTable 5. Error correction model of bila
(1) (2) (
1970–89 1990–99 2
Error correction (lag) 0.31*** 0.23*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (
Time 0.69*** 0.37 
(0.14) (0.49) (
D Real GDP 0.58 1.82*** 2
(0.62) (0.55) (
D Budget balance 0.01 1.45** 
(0.43) (0.59) (
D CPI 0.86*** 0.15 0
(0.30) (0.60) (
Bank crisis (dummy) 15.22 9.19** 
(16.14) (3.86) (
D Conﬂicts (donor) 2.41*** 1.19 0
(0.93) (1.73) (
D Aid (peer mean) 0.00 0.21 0
(0.06) (0.15) (
D Democracies (global) 1.05*** 0.41 1
(0.27) (0.67) (
D Disasters (global) 0.04*** 0.10*** 0
(0.01) (0.03) (
D State conﬂicts (global) 0.96 3.44 0
(0.67) (2.96) (
D Civil conﬂicts (global) 0.04 1.81*** 2
(0.23) (0.61) (
D Low income GDP 0.29 0.56 1
(0.19) (0.61) (
D GDP (mean) 1.20** 2.35** 
(0.56) (1.20) (
Constant 26.49*** 11.02 3
(6.59) (15.17) (
Obs. 292 194 1
R2 stat. 0.19 0.43 0
Hausman stat.
(prob.)
Notes: dependent variable and speciﬁcation follows Table 4; columns (1) to (3)
eﬀects (not reported); column (4) restricts the sample to donors whose average
sample to ‘Medium’ donors; column (6) restricts the sample to remaining dono
corrected standard errors, which adjusts for panel-speciﬁc autocorrelation, he
group estimator. Source: author’s estimates, see Web Appendix B for variable
* 0.1
** 0.05
*** 0.01large and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on variables common to
all donors, the majority of estimates are not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. In other words, heterogeneity between
countries must be taken seriously, a conclusion supported
by the Hausman test in Table 4.
Thus far, a focus has been on evidence for heterogeneity
between countries over the full period 1960–2009. Other
forms of heterogeneity may be of equal or even greater
importance. This is investigated in Table 5, which reports
estimates of the same model for diﬀerent data subsets.
Columns (1) to (3) focus on speciﬁc time periods, in each
case using the PCSE estimator with country ﬁxed eﬀects as
well as lagged error correction terms estimated from country-
speciﬁc long-run models. Columns (4)–(6) investigate the
hypothesis that xdonors may behave similarly within selected
sub-groups. Although various donor groupings might be
considered, for simplicity donors are grouped here according
to the overall volume of aid they provide on average (see
Table 2).teral aid ﬂows, various data subsets
3) (4) (5) (6)
000–09 Donors-I Donors-II Donors-III
0.19** 0.64*** 0.54*** 0.56***
0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)
0.80 0.18 0.49 0.53**
1.13) (0.28) (0.33) (0.24)
.08*** 1.23 2.87 0.95
0.48) (1.11) (1.87) (0.98)
0.81 2.52** 3.03** 0.69
0.70) (1.04) (1.47) (0.84)
.40 0.56 1.37 1.02*
0.56) (0.79) (0.98) (0.53)
1.37 8.38* 2.70 2.04
2.21) (4.78) (6.54) (4.79)
.56 4.05 4.54 7.89**
1.56) (2.74) (4.87) (3.47)
.05 0.27* 0.30 0.25
0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.19)
.66** 0.55 0.02 0.15
0.78) (0.53) (0.99) (0.66)
.06* 0.05** 0.03 0.01
0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
.32 1.17 0.03 4.55*
2.18) (1.93) (2.55) (2.67)
.98** 0.90 1.49 2.69***
1.39) (0.62) (1.15) (0.81)
.20** 0.35 0.48 0.42
0.57) (0.43) (0.71) (0.46)
0.93 0.08 0.44 1.39
1.59) (1.39) (2.39) (1.28)
1.21 2.70 21.49 24.95**
54.76) (13.77) (16.91) (10.72)
96 164 243 329
.28 0.53 0.50 0.58
89.5 17.5 78.3
0.00 0.23 0.00
restrict the sample to the time periods indicated and include country ﬁxed
net real ODA is above US$1 billion (see Table 2); column (5) restricts the
rs; models (1) to (3) estimated by a Prais-Winsten regression using panel-
teroskedasticity and cross-unit correlation; columns (4) to (6) use a mean
deﬁnitions
AID SUPPLIES OVER TIME: ADDRESSING HETEROGENEITY, TRENDS, AND DYNAMICS 41A principal ﬁnding from Table 5 is that donors have
behaved in substantially diﬀerent ways at diﬀerent times.
Not only do the magnitude of estimated coeﬃcients change
over time (that is, between diﬀerent decades), but in some
cases their direction turns from negative (and signiﬁcant) to
positive (and signiﬁcant). For example, during the 1970s and
1980s (column 1) increases in the number of people aﬀected
by disasters were accompanied by a decline in bilateral sup-
plies (on average). This may be because aid was diverted from
bilateral uses to multilateral agencies. In both the 1990s and
2000s, however, the estimated eﬀect of disasters on bilateral
supplies is positive, possibly because donors preferred bilateral
channels.
Focusing in particular on the characteristics of aid during
the most recent decade, three other diﬀerences can be high-
lighted. First, the average speed of adjustment appears to
have fallen from 33% per annum in the 1990s to 17% in
the 2000s. Second, during the 2000s, aid displayed a more
systematic and positive (partial) correlation with democrati-
zation and income growth (in less development countries).
Third, as the coeﬃcient on the civil war term shows,
changes in security risks have been accompanied by larger
increases in aid than in previous periods. Indeed, the global
civil conﬂicts data used here show a sharp rise in the num-
ber of conﬂicts at the beginning of the 2000s, associated
with events in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, for the 2000s,
this variable is likely to be capturing aspects of the aggre-
gate aid response to the War on Terror. These ﬁndings
can be given various interpretations and further country-
speciﬁc studies are warranted to fully probe the issues.
Nonetheless, a plausible general reading is that aid supplies
have been increasingly targeted to speciﬁc regimes and
there is now a stronger connection between uses of aid
and achievement of donors’ security objectives. Moreover,
in addition to between-country heterogeneity, heterogeneity
over time has been fundamental. As such, there is evidence
of distinct ‘aid regimes’ in diﬀerent periods (also Boschini &
Olofsgand, 2007; Fleck & Kilby, 2010).
The ﬁnal three columns of Table 5 underline the persistent
importance of between-country diﬀerences. While there are
some substantive diﬀerences, on average, between the large,
medium, and smaller donors, for two of these groups there
remains signiﬁcant heterogeneity between the members of
each group (reported in the Hausman test results). However,
it bears remarking that larger donors appear to be some-
what more responsive to disasters and to the supply behav-
ior of their peers. However, aid supplied by smaller donors
is most strongly inﬂuenced by conﬂict dynamics. Finally,
there is a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the banking
crisis coeﬃcient for larger donors. This may be capturing a
compensation eﬀect. Systematic banking crises are frequently
associated with other macroeconomic diﬃculties, such as
negative GDP growth, which would reduce expected aid
supplies (as per the model). Larger donors, however, may
well actively compensate for these eﬀects, which amounts
to protecting at least some part of the aid budget from
immediate cuts. This story is consistent with aid supply
behavior in the wake of the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Prelimin-
ary data collated by Zealand and Howes (2012) suggest that
real disbursements of foreign aid by major donors continued
to rise during 2008–2010, but has slowly fallen back since
then. This is exactly that would be predicted by an error
correction model where lower real income levels force adecline of the aid (long-run) target and then gradual adjust-
ment toward this.6. CONCLUSION
This study has taken advantage of rich time series data
about bilateral supplies of foreign aid. Although existing
studies point to a broad range of factors that may drive
how much aid donors provide, important aspects have been
neglected to date. To address these, a conceptual framework
and corresponding econometric techniques were employed to
take explicit account of heterogeneity between donors, diﬀer-
ences between long and short term response factors, as well
as the non-stationary nature of the data. Applying this
approach with recent data, an error correction model for
aid supplies was found to be well supported for almost all
countries. This means that bilateral aid supplies have broadly
followed long-run trends, rooted in ﬁxed and slow-moving
factors, but also have displayed substantial short-run varia-
tion.
Four speciﬁc ﬁndings can be highlighted. First, there is evi-
dence of substantial heterogeneity in aid supply behavior both
between countries and over time. Donors place very diﬀerent
weights on relevant factors when setting long-run aid targets
as well as when making short-run supply decisions. Thus,
where feasible, country-speciﬁc estimates of aid supply behav-
ior—as per the mean group estimator—should be relied on in
place of pooled estimates. Second, despite the fact that donors
are heterogeneous, they do not act in isolation from one
another. There is evidence of positive bandwagon eﬀects, par-
ticularly among larger donors, meaning that donors augment
or reduce aid volumes at similar times. Third, as other studies
have found, domestic macroeconomic conditions have a mate-
rial short-term eﬀect on aid supplies. Donors appear to supply
aid in a moderately pro-cyclical fashion and episodes of ﬁscal
tightening are associated with reductions in aggregate aid bud-
gets (ceteris paribus). However, systemic banking crises do not
display an independent negative inﬂuence on aid supplies.
Fourth, the most recent decade shows a growing link between
aid and security concerns, as well as greater responsiveness of
total aid volumes to democratization and income growth in
developing countries.
Some lessons can be drawn from these ﬁndings. In light of
the heterogeneity of donors, as well as evidence that aid supply
behavior evolves over time (on average), past supplies of
foreign aid may be a poor guide to those of the future.
Previous studies probably have been too conﬁdent in their
ability to make forecasts. Indeed, some authors warned of a
drastic and rapid reduction in aid in response to the global
ﬁnancial crises. The framework and ﬁndings of the present
study are more consistent with recent data that points to a
delayed response in aggregate ﬂows, but also allows for more
persistent falls operating through macroeconomic aggregates
such as ﬁscal consolidation. Thus, the slow but complex way
in which aid responds to domestic and global shocks must
be borne in mind. Finally, a cross-country study such as this
is not able to do full justice to the demonstrably diverse
range of factors that inﬂuence donor aid budgets. As the
number of observations for individual countries increases,
country-speciﬁc models that combine more detailed
information about donor and recipient behavior will be
informative.
NOTES
42 WORLD DEVELOPMENT1. See Juselius, Møller, and Tarp (2013) for a recent application of time t ¼ ð0;1;2Þ lags of these covariates to be the same. This has a small
series methods to the aid eﬀectiveness debate.
2. For an empirical analysis of the aggregate long-run evidence see
Arndt, Jones, and Tarp (2010).
3. These assumptions are not chosen for their convenience. A somewhat
similar approach is found in Mosley (1985), who postulates that while
donor countries may have a ‘‘desired” level of foreign aid giving, which
reﬂects domestic incomes and perceptions of aid quality, actual disburse-
ments will deviate from this level due to local budgetary pressures and the
behavior of other donors.
4. Speciﬁcally: k1i ¼ ½li þ aiðdi1  di2Þ, k2i ¼ 2aid2i and k3i ¼ aici.
5. This ﬁnding is not unique. Bertoli et al. (2008) report that unit root
tests applied to various measures of the Aid/GDP ratio are unable to reject
the null of of a unit root. Note that a variety of (more sophisticated) panel
unit root and cointegration tests are also available such as suggested by
Breitung (2002). However, many of these are not applicable here as the
panel is not strongly balanced and the number of units is modest.
6. As Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue: ‘‘aggregating or pooling dynamic
heterogeneous panels can produce very misleading estimates . . .[meaning]
that the common assumption of homogeneity in dynamic models is far
from innocuous” (p.102).
7. As such, the MG estimator is an unweighted version of the random
coeﬃcients approach due to Swamy (1970).
8. All deﬁnitions follow those of the Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD.
9. For instance, a disaster in December of year t may stimulate an
increased aid response in January of year t þ 1, and perhaps ongoing
disbursements in reconstruction support in future periods.
10. This approach has been used elsewhere (e.g., Lo´pez & Galinato,
2007). The chosen weights are wt2 ¼ 1=7;wt1 ¼ 2=7;wt ¼ 4=7. Techni-
cally this operation has the eﬀect of constraining the coeﬃcients on theimpact on the ﬁnal results and leads to no material changes in the
conclusions. Full details available on request from the author.
11. Following Coakley et al. (2006), a consistent non-parametric
estimator of the asymptotic variance of the unweighted MG estimator
used here is as follows: Varðb^iÞ ¼
PN
i¼1ðb^i  bÞ
2
=½NðN  1Þ. See also
Pesaran (2006).12. There are some interesting correspondences between the ranking of
countries according to these regression R-squared statistics and the Center
for Global Development’s Commitment to Development Index see
www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/cdi/.13. For more advanced treatment of cointegration tests in the panel
context see Persyn and Westerlund (2008), Banerjee (1999). Due to the
unbalanced nature of the present dataset, however, tests proposed by these
authors cannot by implemented in a straight-forward manner. For
instance, the group-mean tests developed by Westerlund (2007) generally
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for a non-zero fraction of the
panel when the dataset is restricted to a balanced subset of panels. Results
available on request.14. This approach is used as it is least sensitive to the relatively small
number of observations available for certain countries; thus fewer
countries have ‘‘missing” results compared to alternative tests based on
the Johansen procedure.15. Asymptotic critical values for the two t-statistics are tR < 3:8738
and tE < 3:7782 based on the methods set out in MacKinnon (1996) and
Ericsson and MacKinnon (2002) respectively, calculated using software
available on MacKinnon’s personal website that takes into account the
number of cointegrating variables, deterministic terms and the quadratic
time speciﬁcation (http://econ.queensu.ca/faculty/mackinnon).16. Simulation evidence presented in Jones (2011) substantiates this
point based on the same modeling approach, but using a somewhat
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